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THE FDA AND DEFERENCE LOST: A SELFINFLICTED WOUND OR THE PRODUCT OF A
WOUNDED AGENCY? A RESPONSE
TO PROFESSOR O'REILLY
David C. Wadeckt

INTRODUCTION

Professor James T. O'Reilly's article Losing Deference in the FDA's
Second Century:JudicialReview, Politics, and a Diminished Legacy of Expertise is a sweeping critique of the decline of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), which until recently was considered one of the
world's premier health and safety agencies. 1 According to Professor
O'Reilly, the FDA's decline, resulting in what he contends is the diminishing judicial deference accorded to Agency determinations, is
entirely the product of a self-inflicted wound-namely, the Bush Ad2
ministration's politicization of the Agency at the expense of science.
To drive home his theory, Professor O'Reilly dissects two case illustrations: first, the Agency's unwarranted denial of approval for the overthe-counter sale to those under eighteen of the drug "Plan B," a
postcoital contraceptive, to appease the Administration's anti-abortion
constituency; and second, the Agency's complete about-face on its
t
Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; Director of the Center of
Health Regulation and Governance of the O'Neill Institute for National and Global Health
Law; Co-Director of the Institute for Public Representation; Scholar with the Center for
Progressive Reform. Prior to joining the Georgetown faculty, Professor Vladeck was an
attorney with Public Citizen Litigation Group, where, among other things, he handled
cases for public health organizations against the Food and Drug Administration and cases
involving preemption questions, arguing in favor of preserving state law. The author is
grateful to Kathryn Sabbeth for her thoughts on this essay and to Lindsey Smith for her
editorial and research assistance.
I
See James T. O'Reilly, Losing Deference in the FDA's Second Century: Judicial Review,
Politics, and a Diminished Legacy of Expertise, 93 CORNELL L. REv. 939 (2008) (describing the
historical reputation of the Agency); see also Peter Barton Hutt, The State of Science at the Food
and Drug Administration, in FDA SCIENCE AND MISSION AT RISK: REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY app. B, at B-7 (2007), http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dock-

ets/ac/07/briefing/ 2007-4329b_02_02_FDA%2OReport%2OAppendices%20A-K.pdf
(reporting results of Harris Polls rating the public confidence in the FDA: during the
1970s, eighty percent of the public had confidence in the Agency; in 2000, sixty-one percent reported confidence in the Agency; by 2006, the percentage of the public having
confidence in the Agency had dropped to thirty-six percent).
2 See O'Reilly, supra note 1, passim.
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preemption policy, giving drug companies the insulation from tort lit3
igation they have long coveted but could not get from Congress.
Professor O'Reilly does not mince words. In his view, the Agency
has fallen victim to a classic case of regulatory capture. 4 The FDA is a
science-based agency and, according to Professor O'Reilly, has historically been faithful to that mandate. 5 However, in Professor O'Reilly's
view, the FDA has been subject to a hostile takeover by ail Administration that cares more about outcomes that serve its constituency than
its statutory mission. 6 To achieve its political goals, the Administration has appointed like-minded conservatives to run health and safety
agencies, including the FDA. 7 The senior appointees at the FDA
(many of whom have returned through the revolving door to represent the pharmaceutical industry) disregarded or marginalized the
career scientists and policy experts who tried to get in their way.8 Key
decisions, like those concerning Plan B and preemption, were made
to benefit the Administration's constituents. 9 Career Agency employees were then pushed to defend those decisions, often at the expense
of science, agency morale, longstanding agency policy, and, ultimately, the Agency's credibility. 10 The result, Professor O'Reilly
claims, is that the Agency has squandered the respect that it had
painstakingly earned from the courts, and thus the FDA will not receive the high level of deference that, in the past, virtually guaranteed
judicial approval of its actions."
These are harsh claims to make. But Professor O'Reilly makes a
convincing case, and his views command respect. 12 So, it is with some
trepidation that I offer an amendment to Professor O'Reilly's self-inflicted wound theory. In my view, Professor O'Reilly is right that some
of the blame for the decline in the FDA's prestige can properly be laid
at the feet of the Bush Administration. I agree wholeheartedly with
Professor O'Reilly that the Agency's policy reversal on preemption is
3 See id. at Parts XII, XIII.
4 Id. at Part XI; see, e.g., GeorgeJ. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELLJ.
ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 3, 11-13 (1971) (laying out the theory behind regulatory capture). See
generally Symposium, On Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REv. 167 (1988) (compiling articles discussing public choice theory).
5 See O'Reilly, supra note 1, at Part V.
6 See id. at Part X.
7

See id.

8 See id.
9 See id. at Parts XII, XIII.
1o See id. at Part IX (describing the various forms of backlash against the FDA's shift
towards an economics-driven view of policy).
"I
See id. at Part XV.
12
Professor O'Reilly has been practicing food and drug law for over thirty years. He
is the author of a leading treatise on the FDA, and has written scores of articles and essays
on the FDA and administrative law. Curriculum Vitae, ProfessorJames T. O'Reilly, http://
www.law.uc.edu/faculty/docs/oreilly.pdf.
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nothing short of an effort to give the pharmaceutical and medical device industry protection from tort litigation, and that the Plan B debacle, which was made to appease anti-abortion groups, was an insult to
the FDA's scientific process. So we share common ground.
But we also part company in some important respects. I do not
share Professor O'Reilly's view that the only reason for the Agency's
decline and the declining deference it receives from courts is a handful of ill-considered, politically motivated decisions. Rather, the FDA's
decline is inextricably tied to the slow erosion of the Agency's resources, coupled with a steady and unrelenting procession of new,
congressionally imposed responsibilities. 13 I agree that the FDA is a
wounded agency, but I place much of the blame on Congress, which
has simultaneously criticized the FDA for poor performance while also
starving the Agency of the resources it needs to meet its burgeoning
responsibilities. By 2001, if not before, the Agency did not have the
necessary resources to fulfill its mission; it is the FDA's resource deficit, as much as regulatory capture, that is to blame for the string of
regulatory failures that began then and have accelerated since. The
FDA is chronically underfunded, overworked, incapable of effectively
tackling the massive job Congress assigned it, and bereft of the leadership needed to defend itself in the court of public opinion. The decline of the FDA's prestige dovetails as much with its inability to
safeguard the American people as it does with the Bush Administration's politicization of the Agency.
This Response presents three brief reflections on Professor
O'Reilly's article. First, the most convincing argument for Professor
O'Reilly's self-inflicted wound thesis is the Agency's ideological shift
on preemption. 14 Not only does it represent an instance in which this
Administration repudiated the legal position taken by its predecessors-making the Bush Administration alone answerable for the consequences of its decision-but it is also a policy shift that, unlike Plan
B, is not self-executing.1 5 Courts, and not the FDA, are the ultimate
decision makers on preemption questions.' 6 Thus, for the FDA's new
position on preemption to have operative effect, the Agency will have
to persuade courts that its current position is legally sustainable. In
deciding this question, courts will have to resolve whether the FDA's
13 See infra notes 44-53, 107-120 and accompanying text.
14 See generally Regulatory Preemption:Are FederalAgencies Usurping Congressionaland State
Authority?: HearingBefore the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, ll0th Cong. (Sept. 12, 2007) [hereinafter Regulatory Preemption] (statement of David C. Vladeck) (testifying on the FDA's new
preemption policy); David A. Kessler & David C. Vladeck, A CriticalExamination of the FDA's
Efforts to Preempt Failure-to-Warn Claims, 96 GEO. L.J. 461 (2008) (offering an extended critique of the FDA's new position on preemption of drug claims).
15 See infra Part I.A.
16 See infra Part I.B.
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new position warrants deference; thus far, courts are deeply split on
the issue.
Second, the Agency's shift in position on preemption could not
have come at a less propitious time. At the same time the FDA is contending that state tort law (and the discipline it places on the marketplace) should be eliminated, the Agency has faced an unprecedented
torrent of regulatory failures. 17 The American people, of course, get
the worst of both worlds under the Agency's view-an FDA incapable
of protecting them, and no tort system to provide compensation if
they are injured. These regulatory failures support Professor
O'Reilly's thesis, but they also support my claim that something more
fundamental is to blame. The problems with drugs like Vioxx, Bextra,
Celebrex, and Avandia, and with medical devices like Guidant defibrillators, Medtronic pacemakers, St. Jude Silzone heart valves, and Sulzer
hip and knee prostheses, were likely to arise regardless of whether the
Administration was placing political pressure on the FDA. These failures resulted from the Agency's structural weaknesses and resource
limitations in its premarket approval and postapproval surveillance
systems, not necessarily from regulatory capture.
Third, Professor O'Reilly worries that the Bush Administration's
political shenanigans have squandered the respect that the Agency
has earned from the courts through a century of reliable science, analytical rigor, and scrupulous political independence.' 8 Assuming that
Professor O'Reilly's view of the FDA's history is correct, the more
pressing query is what, if anything, the Agency can do to restore its
preferred position in court. Here I end where I began. The Agency's
basic problem is that it is ill-equipped to accomplish the Herculean
mission assigned to it by Congress, and that regulatory failure, as
much as regulatory capture, has wounded the Agency and will continue to undermine its credibility in court.1 9 That problem is likely to
persist regardless of which political party occupies the White House.
Congress's recent enactment of the Food and Drug Administration
Amendments Act of 2007 (FDA Amendments Act) is an important but
limited first step to shoring up the Agency's statutory authority. 20 But
even that Act is emblematic of the FDA's lost luster: It imposes unprecedented transparency requirements on the Agency, which will enable Congress and the Agency's critics to second-guess FDA decisions
as they are made.2 ' Until Congress gives the FDA the resources and
political independence it needs to protect the public health, the
17 See infra Part II.
18 See O'Reilly, supra note 1, at Part XV.
19 See infra notes 44-53, 107-120 and accompanying text.
20 Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121
Stat. 823 (to be codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
21 See infra notes 129-130.
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Agency's image will remain tarnished and it will not regain the respect
it was once deservedly given by the courts.
I
THE

FDA's

SELF-INFLICTED WOUND OF PREEMPTION

Professor O'Reilly's most persuasive case for his self-inflicted

wound theory is the Agency's policy reversal on the issue of preemption. 22 This example helps prove Professor O'Reilly's point, but his
account tells only part of the story. Professor O'Reilly focuses on how
and why this about-face was accomplished, but he does not explain
why the FDA's justifications for its policy reversal are so strained that
many courts have given them little or no deference. I therefore begin
where Professor O'Reilly left off, and explain why the FDA's justifications for its decision raise red flags. I then turn to the question of
deference.

A.

The FDA and Drug-Labeling Preemption

Prior to 2002, the FDA had consistently taken the position that its
regulatory efforts could comfortably coexist with state failure-to-warn
litigation brought by consumers injured by FDA-regulated drugs. 23 In
the Agency's view, failure-to-warn litigation was an important additional tool that provided information to patients and physicians about
24
a drug's risks-information that might not otherwise be available.
The FDA now maintains that failure-to-warn litigation threatens its
ability to protect the public health. 25 According to the Agency, ajudicial determination that an FDA-approved warning label fails adequately to warn of a drug's risks may force manufacturers to add
warnings not approved by the FDA or even warnings that the FDA
considered and rejected.2 6 In order to prevent this, the FDA now as27
serts that its regulation preempts most failure-to-warn litigation.
22
23

See O'Reilly, supra note 1, at Part XIII.
Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 14, at 463.

24

Id.

25 Id.; see, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting the DefendantAppellee and Cross-Appellant, and in Favor of Reversal of the District Court's Order Denying Partial SummaryJudgment to Defendant-Appellee and Cross-Appellant at 23-24, Motus
v. Pfizer, Inc., 358 F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 2004) (Nos. 02-55372, 02-55498) [hereinafter Amicus
Brief for the United States, Motus v. Pfier].
26
Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drugs
and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3935 (Jan. 24, 2006) (effective June 30, 2006)
(to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 314, 601); see also Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 14, at
463-64.
27 See Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 14, at 474 (noting the FDA's argument that increased disclosure "'can erod[e], and disrupt[] the careful and truthful representation of
benefits and risks that prescribers need to make appropriate judgments about drug use.
Exaggeration of risk could discourage appropriate use of a beneficial drug.' ") (quoting
Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3935).
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There is no question that the FDA's new position on preemption
represents a 180-degree shift. It is therefore worth asking why the
Agency decided to reverse a position consistently held during past Administrations. All of the conventional justifications agencies cite when
they reverse field can be quickly ruled out.28 One cannot attribute the
FDA's shift in position to an intervening Supreme Court ruling that
might have cast doubt on the Agency's position, nor have there been
any statutory changes that would have prompted Agency reconsideration. Although there has been a steady stream of failure-to-warn litigation (as well as complaints about the litigation from drug companies),
Congress has not enacted a preemption provision shielding drug
29
manufacturers from such liability.

Without a conventional justification at hand, the Agency could
only argue that courts should find "implied" preemption, insofar as
failure-to-warn cases challenge the FDA's determination that a drug's
28 See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 41-42 (1983) (noting that discretion can be refused if the agency's decision is
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion," or if it is inconsistent with prior practices);
Int'l Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Donovan, 722 F.2d 795, 814-15 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(discussing the nature of judicial review, as per State Farm, under the arbitrary and capricious standard). See generally Merrick B. Garland, DeregulationandJudicialReview, 98 HARv.
L. REv. 507 (1985) (discussing judicial review of administrative agency decisions).
29 The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FD&C Act), as originally enacted, contained no preemption provision. See Pub. L. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). In the 1962 amendments to the FD&C Act,
Congress included a clause expressly limiting the preemptive effect of the statute: "Nothing in the amendments made by this Act to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act shall
be construed as invalidating any provision of State law . . . unless there is a direct and
positive conflict between such amendments and such provision of State law." Drug
Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 202, 76 Stat. 780, 793 (codified as amended at
21 U.S.C. § 321 (2000)). When Congress revisited the Act in 2007, drug companies hoped
that Congress would add an express preemption provision barring tort litigation; Congress
did not do so. Cf Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 166-67
(1989) (noting, in the context of a different legal issue, that Congress tends to make clear
when it wants state law to control). Instead, Congress adopted a "rule of construction."
Pub. L. No. 110-85, §901(a), 121 Stat. 823, 823 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(o)(4)(I)). The rule of construction establishes that the FDA's new authority to order labeling changes does not alter manufacturers' preexisting obligations, such as the one
set forth in 21 C.F.R. § 314.70, requiring manufacturers to amend labels to strengthen
warnings and to add contra-indications as soon as safety information is available. There is
no question that the House added this provision to "clarify that nothing in this legislation
or in current law is intended to preempt remedies for consumers injured by dangerous
drugs." H.R. REP. No. 110-225, at 197 (2007); see also 153 CONG. REC. SI 1,831-84 (Sept. 20,
2007) (statement of Sen. Kennedy); id. at S11,834 (statement of Sen. Leahy); id. at S1I,835
(statement of Sen. Durbin). Senator Allard expressed disappointment at Congress's failure to preempt drug claims by arguing that the new legislation would "open the floodgates" to litigation and would be "a definite boon to trial lawyers." Id. at S11,836-37. As
one Washington, D.C., law firm put it, "Contrary to the expectations of many, the FDA
Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA), signed into law by the President in late September,
does not contain any provision expressly preempting state laws." Kimberly K. Egan & Alysson Russell Snow, Does the FDA Amendments Act of 2007 Preempt State Law? DLA PIPER, NEWS
& INSIGHTS, Oct. 10, 2007, http://www.dlapiper.com/state-preemption/.
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labeling was adequate. According to the Agency, warnings that overstate or exaggerate risks are no more helpful to physicians and patients than warnings that downplay those risks.i 0 Striking the right
balance takes expertise and judgment. Thus, the FDA now claims,
failure-to-warn litigation threatens the Agency's control of drug labeling, and FDA decisions should not be subject to second-guessing by
3
courts. '

The FDA's argument is misplaced for several reasons. First and
foremost, the FDA did not address the "why now?" question. There
was no reason for the FDA to change its position in 2002: failure-towarn litigation has been a fixture for decades, 32 but the Agency had
never before claimed that such lawsuits threatened to undermine its
regulatory efforts. So why does failure-to-warn litigation now stand as
an obstacle to the FDA's performance of its duties? On that point, the
Agency has no answer.
There is a reason for the FDA's silence. 33 Failure-to-warn litigation does not challenge the FDA's decision to approve a label for a
new drug, or even the Agency's final say over the form and contents of
drug labeling. 3 4 Instead, failure-to-warn litigation challenges the company's failure to revise its labeling to warn about risks unknown at the
time of approval, or risks that turn out to be graver than the company
(and the FDA) originally thought. 35 The FDA's own regulations impose a duty on drug manufactures to modify labeling without delay
when hazards emerge and expressly authorize labeling changes without the Agency's advance approval.36 Thus, the common law duty en30
Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3935
("Overwarning, just like underwarning, can similarly have a negative effect on patient
safety and public health.").
31
See Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 14, at 463-64.
32
See, e.g., Stanton v. Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc., 718 F.2d 553, 563-69 (3d Cir. 1983);
Ezagui v. Dow Chem. Corp., 598 F.2d 727, 733 (2d Cir. 1979); Hoffman v. Sterling Drug,
Inc., 485 F.2d 132, 141-42 (3d Cir. 1973); Parke-Davis & Co. v. Stromsodt, 411 F.2d 1390,
1401 (8th Cir. 1969); Orthopedic Equip. Co., Inc., v. Eutsler, 276 F.2d 455 (4th Cir. 1960);
Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 507 P.2d 653, 660-64 (Cal. 1973); Toole v. RichardsonMerrell, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 398, 412-14 (Cal. App. 1967); Bristol-Myers Co. v. Gonzales, 561
S.W.2d 801, 803-04 (Tex. 1978); see also Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1013 n.2,
1017 n.11 (2008) (Ginsburg,J., dissenting) (collecting cases).
33
See Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 14, at 476 (developing the argument offered
herein).
34
See id.
35
See id.
36
See 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.70, 201.57(c) (6), 201.80(e) (2007); 44 Fed. Reg. 37,434, 37,447
(june 26, 1979) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 202) (noting that FDA labeling rules do not
affect a manufacturer's duty to provide warnings to doctors and patients through labeling,
advertising, or "Dear Doctor" letters, when the manufacturer discovers risks not clearly
stated on the label). In a transparent effort to shore up its position in litigation, the FDA
has now proposed to amend these rules to require FDA's prior approval on any label
change. Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs, Biologics, and Medical Devices, 73 Fed. Reg. 2848, 2848-54 (Jan. 16, 2008) (to be codified at
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forced in failure-to-warn litigation-namely a drug company's duty to
take all reasonable measures to alert physicians and patients to previously unknown hazards-is no different than the duty the FDA itself
imposes on drug manufacturers. That is why the steady procession of
failure-to-warn cases has not interfered with the Agency's regulatory
efforts for all of these years: the duties imposed by state and federal
37
laws are parallel and mutually reinforcing.
For this reason, the FDA's claim that recent lawsuits have
"threatened the agency's ability to regulate . . .risk information for

prescription drugs" cannot withstand examination.3 8 In fact, the
handful of cases cited by the Agency undercut its interference claim.
The chief case that the FDA relies on, Dowhal v. SmithKline Beecham
Consumer Healthcare,39 was not a product liability case, but an action to
compel a drug company to add warnings required by a California
law. 40

The California Supreme Court held that requiring warnings

different from those the FDA required constituted an actual conflict
between federal and state law, and thus state law had to yield. 4 1 Two
other cases the FDA cites also involved actions to compel changes to
drug labeling; neither succeeded. 42 Only a few of the FDA's illustrative cases were failure-to-warn actions, and the FDA offered no expla21 C.F.R. pts. 314, 601, 814). As noted below, courts that have rejected the FDA's preemption position often use these regulations to establish that manufacturers have wide leeway
to add warnings to labels and then seek FDA approval. The proposed rule change aims at
undercutting that argument. See id. at 2852-53.
37
See generally Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 496-97 (1996) (holding that a
tort claim based on state law duties "equal to, or substantially identical to, requirements
imposed" by federal law is not preempted) (citation omitted); see also id. at 513 (O'Connor,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
38
Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug
and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934 (Jan. 24, 2006) (effective June 30, 2006)
(codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 314, 601); see Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 14, at 481-83
(developing the argument offered herein); see also Margaret Gilhooley, Addressing Potential
DrugRisks: The Limits of Testing, Risk Signals, Preemption, and the Drug Reform Legislation, 59
S.C. L. REV. 347 (2008).
39
88 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2004); see Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling, 71
Fed. Reg. at 3934 n.7 (citing Dowha 88 P.3d 1).
40
See Dowha4 88 P.3d at 3.
41
See id. at 14-15.
42
See Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3934 n.7
(citing In rePaxil Litig. (In rePaxill), No. CV-01-07937(MRP), 2002 WL 1940708 (C.D. Cal.
Aug. 16, 2002); Bernhardt v. Pfizer, Inc., Nos. 1:00CV04042(LMM), l:00CV04379(LMM),
2000 WL 1738645 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2000)). In rePaxilwas a class action lawsuit brought
against GlaxoSmithKline by users of Paxil, who sought to enjoin the company from advertising that "Paxil is non-habit forming." In re Paxil I, 2002 WL 1940708, at *1. Although
the court initially agreed to enter injunctive relief, it reversed that ruling two months later.
In re Paxil Litig. (In re Paxil I1), No. CV-01-07937(MRP), 2002 WL 31375497, at *1 (C.D.
Cal. Oct. 18, 2002). Bernhardt v. Pfizer, Inc. was an action seeking an order requiring Pfizer
to send information about one of their drugs letter to users and physicians. 2000 WL
1738645, at *1. The court found that the plaintiffs lacked standing and that the FD&C Act
preempted the injunctive relief sought. See id. at *1-3.
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nation as to how these cases threatened the Agency's authority over
drug labeling. 43 Not a single case sought to compel a labeling change,
and none resulted in a labeling change. Thus, none of these cases
support the FDA's claim that failure-to-warn litigation threatens its
ability to protect the public's health and well-being.
More fundamentally, the FDA's preemption argument presupposes that the Agency has the resources to perform the monumental
task of ensuring that the labeling of marketed drugs reflects current
safety information. 4 4 It does not. According to the November 2007
report of a blue-ribbon panel appointed by the FDA Commissioner,
"[t] he scientific demands on the Agency far exceed its capacity to respond. This imbalance is imposing a significant risk to the integrity of
the . . . regulatory system, and hence the safety of the public. ' 45 The
Institute of Medicine similarly reported in 2006 that the FDA "lacks
the resources needed to accomplish its large and complex mission today, let alone to position itself for an increasingly challenging future. ' 46 The FDA regulates products that account for one-quarter of

consumer spending in the United States, 47 amounting to $1 trillion
annually, 48 but has only nine thousand employees nationwide. 49 According to the most recent statistics, the FDA's Office of New Drugs,
which reviews new drug applications, employs over one thousand physicians and scientists to review the approximately one hundred new
drug applications it receives each year and to supervise postmarketing
studies.5 ° In contrast, the Agency's Office of Surveillance and Epidemiology, the unit charged with monitoring adverse events associated
with over eleven thousand drugs currently on the market 51 (including
43
See Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3934 n.7
(citing In re Paxil 1, 2002 WL 1940708, Motus v. Pfizer, Inc., 127 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (C.D. Cal.
2000), afrd, 358 F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 2004), and Bernhardt,2000 WL 1738645).
44
See Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 14, at 484-86 (developing the argument offered
herein).
45
FDA SCIENCE AND MISSION AT RISK: REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY § 1.1 (2007), http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/AC/07/briefing/20074329b_02_01_FDA%2OReport%20on%2OScience%20and%2OTechnology.pdf [hereinafter
FDA SCIENCE AND MISSION AT RISK].
46

INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY: PROMOTING AND PROTECTING

193 (2007) [hereinafter INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE].
Administration, FDA News: The Food and Drug Administration Celebrates 100 Years of Service to the Nation, http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/
NEWS/2006/NEW01292.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2008).
48
FDA SCIENCE AND MISSION AT RISK, supra note 45, § 1.1.
49
U.S. Food and Drug Administration, FDA Overview, www.fda.gov/oc/opacom/fda
101/sldO5.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2008); see also FDA SCIENCE AND MISSION AT RISK, Supra
note 45, § 2.1 (describing the Agency's core regulatory functions).
50
See Hearings on Ensuring Drug Safety: Where Do We Go From Here?: HearingBefore the S.
Comm. on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, 109th Cong. 42 (2005) (statement of Dr.
Bruce M. Psaty).
51
Regulatory Preemption, supra note 14, at 11.
THE HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC
47
U.S. Food and Drug
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over three thousand prescription drugs),52 has about one hundred
and thirty professional employees. 53 Congress recently enacted the
FDA Amendments Act, which will bolster the Agency's statutory authority. 54 But as Senator Ted Kennedy, the Act's principal Senate

sponsor, warned, even with added resources "[tihe resources of the
drug industry to collect and analyze .. .safety data vastly exceed the

resources of the FDA, and no matter what we do, they will always have
vastly greater resources to monitor the safety of their products than
55
the FDA does.
Nor can the FDA's new position square with the Agency's longstanding recognition that failure-to-warn litigation helps uncover and
assess risks not apparent to the Agency during the drug approval process, and that this "feedback loop" enables the Agency to better do its
job. 56 FDA approval of drugs is generally based on clinical trials that
57
involve (at most) a few thousand patients and often last only a year.
These trials cannot detect risks that are relatively rare, have long latency periods, or affect vulnerable sub-populations. 58 For this reason,
most serious adverse effects do not become evident until a drug is
used in larger population groups for periods in excess of one year. 59
Time and again, failure-to-warn litigation has brought to light information that would otherwise not be available to the FDA, doctors,
other health care providers, or consumers. 60 And failure-to-warn liti52

Id.

53 See U.S. Food and Drug Administration, FDA Drug Safety Initiative: Fact Sheet,
http://www.fda.gov/oc/factsheets/initiative.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2008) (reporting that
since 2004 the Office of Surveillance and Epidemiology (formerly the Office of Drug
Safety) "has increased the staffing dedicated to the post-marketing safety program by almost 25 percent (94 to 132 F[ull] T[ime] E[mployee][ ]s)").
54 Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121
Stat. 823 (to be codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
55 153 CONG. Rrc. Sl1,832 (2007) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
56 See Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 14, at 463 (developing the argument offered
herein); see also Prescription Drug Product Labeling: Medication Guide Requirements, 63
Fed. Reg. 66,378, 66,384 (Dec. 1, 1998) (effective June 1, 1999) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pts.
201, 208, 314, 601, 610) ("FDA does not believe that the evolution of state tort law will
cause the development of standards that would be at odds with the agency's regulations.");
MargaretJane Porter, The Lohr Decision: FDA Perspective and Position, 52 FoOD & DRUG LJ.
7, 11 (1997).
57 See U.S. Food and Drug Administration, The FDA's Drug Review Process: Ensuring
Drugs Are Safe and Effective, http://www.fda.gov/fdac/special/testtubetopatient/drugreview.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2008).
58 Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 14, at 471.
59 See, e.g., Risk and Responsibility: The Roles of FDA and PharmaceuticalCompanies in Ensuring Safety of Approved Drugs, Like Vioxx, HearingBefore the H. Comm. on Government Reform,
109th Cong. 55 (2005) (testimony of Steven Galson, Acting Director, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, United States Food and Drug Administration).
60
See infra notes 87-93 and accompanying text (discussing the evidence uncovered
during the Merck failure-to-warn litigation).
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gation has often preceded and clearly influenced FDA decisions to
modify labeling-and, at times, to withdraw drugs from the market. 6 1
Congress is, of course, acutely aware of the shortcomings in the
FDA's ability to police the marketplace on drug safety. 6 2 The recent
public health failures involving widely prescribed drugs like Vioxx,
Bextra, Celebrex, and Avandia have driven home these shortcomings. 63 Indeed, the FDA Amendments Act reflects Congress's dissatis64
faction with the FDA's performance.
It is precisely for these reasons that the FDA's critics have concluded that the Agency effected its dramatic change in position on
preemption for political reasons, as opposed to scientific or public
policy concerns. 65 The Agency's decision to announce its new position in an amicus brief filed in support of a drug company that was
involved in private litigation fueled those suspicions. 66 And the substantive deficiencies in the FDA's justification cemented the conclusion that the Agency now aligned itself with the industry it was
67
supposed to oversee.

In the past, the FDA generally submitted its decisions on preemption policy to the rulemaking process, thereby subjecting the decision
to public comment and ultimately to judicial review. 68 The FDA is
also required by Executive Order to give state and local governments
notice and an opportunity to participate in any proceeding that may
affect state or local law. 69 The FDA did none of this with its new preemption position. Not only did the Agency announce its policy shift
in an amicus brief unsolicited by the court, 70 but thereafter the FDA's
Chief Counsel publicly urged drug companies to request the Agency
61
See Regulatory Preemption, supra note 14, at 11; see, e.g., Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jerry
Avorn, The Role of Litigation in Defining Drug Risks, 297JAMA 308, 309 (2007) (citing examples); Karen E. Lasser et al., Timing of New Black Box Warnings and Withdrawalsfor Prescription
Medications, 287 JAMA 2215, 2217-18 (2002) (same).
62
Regulatory Preemption, supra note 14 (giving testimony before Congress regarding
the FDA's shortcomings).
63
Id. at 11.
64
See infta note 130 and accompanying text.
65
See, e.g., Hutt, supra note 1.
66 See Amicus Brief for the United States, Motus v. Pfizer, supra note 25; see also Margaret H. Clune, Stealth Tort Reform: How the Bush Administration'sAggressive Use of the Preemption Doctrine Hurts Consumers 2-9 (Ctr. for Progressive Regulation, White Paper No. 403,
2004), available at http://www.progressiveregulation.org/articles/preemption.pdf.
67
See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
68
See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 808.1 (2007) (defining the scope of preemption under the
1976 Medical Device Amendments to the FD&C Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360(k)(A)-(B) (2000)).
69
Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255, 43,257 (Aug. 10, 1999) ("When an
agency proposes to act through adjudication or rulemaking to preempt State law, the
agency shall provide all affected State and local officials notice and an opportunity for
appropriate participation in the proceedings.").
70
See Amicus Brief for the United States, Motus v. Pfizer, supra note 25.
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71
When the
to file amicus briefs supporting their preemption claims.

Agency finally decided to formalize its position, it simply inserted its
announcement into the preamble to a final rule-even though the
preamble to the proposed rule said that it would not have a preemptive effect. 72 Tactics like these clearly underscore the ad hoc nature of
73
the Agency's action.

B.

Deference and Drug Preemption Litigation

Professor O'Reilly cautiously predicts that, as a result of the clear
political motivations driving the Agency's change in preemption policy, courts will give less deference to the FDA than they have in the
past.7 4 That is a risky prediction. The Supreme Court recently observed that agencies' judgments about the preemptive reach of their
actions are entitled to judicial deference. 75 And, although Professor
O'Reilly does not develop this point, the FDA's track record in judicial
proceedings has been, until recently, the envy of other agencies. Until the 2000 ruling in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Cop.,76 the
Agency had a stellar track record before the Court. In fact, the Court
71

See Daniel E. Troy, FDA Involvement in Product Liability Lawsuits, UPDATE: FoOD &

DRUG LAW, REG., & EDUC. MAC., Jan./Feb. 2003, at 7-8.

72 See Prescription Drug Product Labeling, Medication Guide Requirements: Final
Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. 66,378, 66,384 (Dec. 1, 1998) (effectiveJune 1, 1999) (codified at C.F.R.
pts. 201, 208, 314, 601, 610) ("[T]he written patient medication information provided does
not alter the duty, or set the standard of care for manufacturers .... "); id. ("FDA does not
believe that the evolution of state tort law will cause the development of standards that
would be at odds with the agency's regulations."); see also In re Bextra & Celebrex Mktg.
Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., No. M:05-1699(CRB), 2006 WL 2374742, at *8 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 16, 2006) (observing that "the FDA's current view of the preemptive effect of its
labeling regulations is a 180-degree reversal of its prior position"). Professor Nina A. Mendelson has argued against granting presumptive deference to agency views of preemption.
See Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REv. 737, 758 (2004).
73 The fact that the FDA developed its position through such informal means is one
factor that may bear on the degree of deference it receives in court. Cf United States v.
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001) (noting that courts can consider "formality" when
deciding whether Congress has impliedly delegated authority to the agency). Courts might
also undercut the deference generally accorded if the agency's new position on preemption conflicts with its longstanding, contrary position. Id. See generally Catherine M.
Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble:FederalAgencies and the Federalizationof Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL
L. REv. 227 (2007) (outlining a perceived trend of judicial deference toward agency preemption interpretation).
74 O'Reilly, supra note 1, at Part XVII.
75 Indeed, in two of the most recent FDA preemption cases, the Court gave deference
to the FDA's position. In Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 496 (1996), the Court found
the FDA's interpretation of its preemption regulation persuasive. And in Buckman Co. v.
Plaintiffs'LegalComm, 531 U.S. 341, 353 (2001), the Court followed the path laid out in an
amicus brief filed on the FDA's behalf. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioner, Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 US. 341 (2001) (No.
98-1768). And in another preemption case, this one involving the Department of Transportation, the Court deferred to an agency's views of the preemptive sweep of one of its
regulations. See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 883 (2000).
76 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
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had previously gone out of its way to emphasize the deference owed to
the FDA because of its scientific expertise and the complexity of its
judgments. 77 And, in its most recent ruling involving the FDA, Riegel
v. Medtronic, Inc.,7 3 the Court, in finding tort claims against manufacturers of medical devices specifically approved by the FDA to be preempted, suggested that had it not found the preemption provision in
the medical device statute to "speak[ ] clearly to the point at issue;" it
may have accorded some degree of deference to the FDA's position
on the issue-even though the Agency's earlier position was
different.

79

Nonetheless, at least with respect to the FDA's new position on
preemption of drug claims, there is reason to believe that Professor
O'Reilly's prediction may be correct.8 0 The Riegel Court went out of
its way to stress that its decision-that the express preemption provision of the Medical Device Amendments bars tort claims challenging
Agency-approved medical devices-does not bear on the drug provisions of the Act, which contain no preemption provision.8 1 Many
courts that have examined the FDA's position on failure-to-warn
claims for pharmaceuticals, including the court handling the Vioxx
multi-district litigation, have refused to accord the FDA's preemption
position any deference at all.8 2 Perhaps most importantly, the first-

and, at this writing, only-appellate court decision on the issue, the
Vermont Supreme Court's decision in Levine v. Wyeth, resoundingly
77 See, e.g., Young v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 982-83 (1986); United States
v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 555 (1979).
78 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008).
79
Id. at 1009. The Court reasoned that full-bore deference under United States v.
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001), might not be warranted given the Agency's complete
reversal of field on the question. The Court nonetheless thought that the Agency's current
position supporting preemption might be entitled to deference under Skidmore v. Swift &
Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), because the view was a plausible one that was clearly articulated
by the Agency. Id.
See In re Bextra & Celebrex Mktg. Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., No. M:0580
1699(CRB), 2006 WL 2374742, at *6-7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2006); Needleman v. Pfizer,
Inc., No. 3:03-CV-3074-N, 2004 WL 1773697, at *4-5 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2004). But see
Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 514, 525 (E.D. Pa. 2006). When the FDA shifted
its position on preemption of failure-to-warn claims for drugs, it also reversed field on the
separate question of whether FDA premarket approval of medical devices preempts tort
liability for defective design and failure-to-warn claims. The Supreme Court upheld the
FDA's position, although it did so on the ground that the statute explicitly preempted such
claims. See Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1009-10. See generally David C. Vladeck, Preemption and Regulatoiy Failure, 33 PEPP. L. REv. 95 (2005) (critiquing the FDA's position on medical device
preemption).
See Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1009-10.
81
82
See In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 2d 776, 786 (E.D. La. 2007); In re

Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 489 F. Supp. 2d 230, 273 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); Witczak v. Pfizer,
Inc., 377 F. Supp. 2d 726, 730 (D. Minn. 2005); Zikis v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 04-C-8104, 2005 WL
1126909, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. May 9, 2005).
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83
rejected the FDA's position and found it unworthy of deference.
84
This lack of deference represents a sharp break from tradition. But
the deference question will remain unresolved until the Supreme
Court issues its ruling in Levine, which is not likely to come until late
in 2008.
Although it is too early to tell whether this trend in the lower
courts will persist, the preliminary evidence supports Professor
O'Reilly's thesis. The trend against deference is good news for those
unhappy with the Agency's new preemption position and who therefore are eager to see it rejected by the courts. However, for those who
care more about the FDA's long-term ability to do its work without
intrusive judicial oversight, these rulings may be the harbingers of a
troubled future for the FDA.

II
PREEMPTION IN A TIME OF REGULATORY FmILURE

Even the staunchest defenders of the FDA's new pro-preemption
position must concede that the Agency's timing could not have been
worse: at about the same time it announced its shift in position, the
Agency faced a flood of high-profile regulatory failures.8 5 Most prominent, of course, have been the serious and unforeseen health risks
that emerged with respect to drugs the FDA had recently approved,
including new pain medicines like Vioxx, Celebrex, and Bextra, and
86
the diabetes drug Avandia.
Failure-to-warn litigation involving these drugs has uncovered significant evidence that the manufacturers knew of the serious risks that
these drugs posed but did not convey their findings promptly to the
32 (Vt. 2006), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 1118
83 See Levine v. Wyeth, 2006 Vt. 107,
(2008) (mem.).
84 See O'Reilly, supra note 1, at Part XV. One can infer from Professor O'Reilly's article that a court's views of deference will be outcome-determinative. Experience tends to
prove that view correct: courts that defer to the FDA find preemption while courts that find
the FDA's position does not warrant deference find no preemption. Compare, e.g., Levine,
32 (rejecting the argument that it should defer to the FDA's views on
2006 Vt. 107, at
preemption and thereafter rejecting the drug company's preemption argument), with
Dobbs v. Wyeth Pharms., 530 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1288-89 (W.D. Okla. 2008) (deferring to
the FDA's view on preemption and thereafter holding in favor of the drug company on
preemption grounds).
85 The FDA first asserted its pro-preemption position in court in its amicus brief filed
in Motus v. Pfizer, Inc. Amicus Brief for the United States, Motus v. Pfizer, supra note 25.
Fallout from the Vioxx debacle began when Merck pulled the drug from the market on
September 30, 2004. See, e.g., BarnabyJ. Feder, Vioxx Recall May Bring Flood of Suits to Merck,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2004, at C2; Linda Loyd, Vioxx Fallout Hits Merck: Profit Falls; 300 Suits
Filed, PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 22, 2004, at C1. For a review of Vioxx's regulatory history, see
Margaret Gilhooley, Vioxx's History and the Need for Better Procedures and Better Testing, 37
SETON HALL L. REv. 941 (2007).

86 See Bruce Japsen, Meeting May Decide Diabetes Drugs' Fate; FDA Advisers Could Query
Takeda's Acts, CHI. TIUB., July 30, 2007, at Cl.
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FDA.8 7 For instance, litigation has revealed that Merck, the manufacturer of Vioxx, was aware of the heart attack risk associated with the
drug well before the company alerted the FDA.88 Specifically, the
plaintiffs' lawyers uncovered internal company memoranda and emails that Merck did not provide to the FDA.89 One memorandum
warned that, in a study designed to show that Vioxx decreased the risk
of gastrointestinal bleeding, the test group should be limited to patients also taking aspirin; otherwise, there would be a "substantial
chance that significantly higher rates" of cardiovascular disease would
be revealed. 90 Similarly, an internal e-mail warned that if patients did
not receive aspirin in addition to Vioxx, the patients "will get more
thrombotic events and kill [the] drug."9 1 In response, a senior company doctor agreed that "the possibility of increased CV [cardiovascular] events is of great concern" and urged Merck to exclude potential
subjects with a high risk of cardiovascular problems from the study so
that cardiovascular problems "would not be evident." 92 Evidence uncovered in litigation also revealed that Merck scientists considered
combining Vioxx with other drugs to reduce the risk of heart attacks
93
and strokes.
At the same time that the Agency was facing a string of regulatory
failures with respect to drugs, it was experiencing a similar, or perhaps
even worse, spate of problems with medical devices. 94 That is not necessarily surprising, for it is more difficult to test medical devices for
safety and effectiveness than it is to test drugs. 95 This difficulty explains why the statutory standard for approving medical devices-a
reasonable assurance of the device's safety and effectiveness-is lower
than the standard for drugs, which may receive approval only if shown

87
See Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 14, at 492-95 (offering a variety of examples of
drug manufacturers' failure to disclose information to the Agency).
88
See Anna Wilde Mathews & Barbara Martinez, E-Mails Suggest Merck Knew Vioxx's
Dangers at Early Stage, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 2004, at Al.
89
See id.

90

Id.

Id.
Id.
93
Assoc. Press, File Shows Merck Sought to Change Vioxx, L.A. TIMES, June 23, 2005, at
C3. Litigation also uncovered Merck-sponsored studies that found a high death rate
among Alzheimer's patients taking Vioxx as compared to a placebo group. See Heather
Won Tesoriero, Attorneys Question Disclosureby Merck of Vioxx-Study Deaths, WALL ST. J., Sept.
28, 2005, at D4.
94
See supra notes 99-103.
95
See generally Pamela S. Saha & Subrata Saha, Clinical 77ials of Medical Devices and
Implants: Ethical Concerns, IEEE ENGINEERING MED. & BIOLOGY MAc., June 1988, at 85 (stating the particular importance of clinical trial studies as regards the development of
devices).
91

92
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to be safe and effective for their intended use. 96 Ethical constraints
limit the testing of experimental life-saving or life-sustaining medical devices on healthy subjects; thus, devices often receive approval
on the basis of a single clinical trial. 97 For this reason, it is not
uncommon for unforeseen risks to emerge after medical devices are approved for general marketing. 98 Nevertheless, the growing number of serious failures is cause for alarm. Just in the past
few years there have been massive recalls of defibrillators, 99 pacemakers,1 0 0 heart valves,10 1 hip and knee prostheses, 0 2 and heart
96 Compare 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c(a)(1), 360d(a) (2) (A) (2000) (providing the standard
for medical devices), with 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2000 & Supp. V 2005) (providing the standard for drugs).
97
See Saha & Saha, supra note 95, at 86 ("Trials on healthy subjects are condemned by
the Nuremburg Code, the Tokyo Declaration, and the Helsinki Declaration of the World
Medical Association.").
98 See id. at 85 ("Unless we decide to discontinue all innovative work and hold
medicine to the [status quo], it is given that patients will be subject to some unforeseen
risks in new treatments that come with the promise of improved care.").
99 Consider the case of the Guidant Prizm II defibrillators: even after Guidant learned
of serious defects in these devices, and even after Guidant had developed a newer, safer
model, the company kept selling the defective defibrillators until forced by adverse publicity (generated by the death of a twenty-one-year-old college student and the subsequent
tort litigation) to recall the devices. By that time, more than 24,000 of the defective devices
had been implanted in patients, who then faced the daunting decision of whether to have
replacement surgery. See In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prod. Liab. Litig.,
No. 05-1708(DWF/AJB), 2007 WL 1725289, at *1-4 (D. Minn. June 12, 2007) (mem.);
Barry Meier, FDA ExpandingInquiry into Heart-Device Company, N.Y. TiMEs, Aug. 25, 2005, at
C3.
100
Although the FDA approved the Medtronic 4004M pacemaker, it was later determined to be defectively designed. Some patients died when the pacemaker's lead failed,
forcing many patients to undergo open-heart surgery to replace the defective part. See
Goodlin v. Medtronic, Inc., 167 F.3d 1367, 1368 (11th Cir. 1999).
101
The FDA approved the St. Jude Silzone heart valve on the basis of testing that
involved only 792 human subjects. After St. Jude starting selling the valve, testing revealed
that its silver coating not only did not protect against infection, but also caused the valves
to leak. Litigation publicized the risk and forced St. Jude to recall the problem valves, but
not until they had been implanted in over 36,000 patients. See In re St. Jude, Inc. Silzone
Heart Valves Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 01-1396 JRTFLN, 2004 WL 45503, at *1-2 (D.
Minn. Jan. 5, 2004); see also Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 141, 170 (S.D. Ohio 1992)
(approving settlement in a class action suit involving 55,000 patients who received defective heart valves).
102
The FDA granted approval to the Sulzer hip and knee implants, but it soon turned
out that a manufacturing defect kept the implants from bonding properly with patients'
bones. See In re Sulzer Hip Prosthesis & Knee Prosthesis Liab. Litig. (In re Sulzer 1), 455 F.
Supp. 2d 709, 712 (N.D. Ohio 2006). Testimony in litigation exposed the fact that the
problem was caused by unsanitary conditions at the manufacturing facility. SeeJ. Scott Orr
& Robert Cohen, Messy Plant Made Faulty HipJoints, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Aug.
13, 2002, at A-1. In December 2000, Sulzer finally notified the FDA that it recalled about
40,000 defective hip implants, 26,000 of which had been implanted in patients. See In re
Sulzer Hip Prosthesis & Knee Prosthesis Liab. Litig. (In re Sulzer I1), 268 F. Supp. 2d 907,
910-11 (N.D. Ohio 2003). Among the failed implants were approximately 6100 units that
Sulzer, with the FDA's permission, reprocessed and sold. See id. at 911. Many of the victims
needed to undergo multiple additional surgeries to remove the faulty devices and replace
them with more effective ones. See, e.g., Orr & Cohen, supra (describing the procedures
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pumps' 03-all of which have exacted a serious toll on the patients who
face the daunting prospect of removal-and-replacement surgeries.
The combined effect of these regulatory failures has been a
0 4
steady drumbeat of headlines critical of the Agency's performance.1
Unsurprisingly, these press accounts have eroded the FDA's prestige
to the point that only one-third of Americans claim confidence in the
Agency. 0 5 Professor O'Reilly's account of the FDA's decline says little
about the Agency's past failures; however, these regulatory failures
have contributed far more to the erosion of the Agency's prestige
10 6
than has regulatory capture.
The FDA has reached a critical point in its history: it has enormous and growing responsibilities, yet Congress has flat-lined its appropriations. 10 7 A report issued by an FDA panel describes in great
undergone by one plaintiff and also noting that many members of the class had similar
experiences).
103
See generally Horn v. Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d 163, 164-65, 167 (3d Cir. 2004)
(finding a claim against the manufacturer of a heart pump preempted).
104
Even Reader's Digest has recently run an article critical of the FDA's failure to
safeguard consumers from dangerous drugs. See Alexis Jetter, One Drug, Many Tragedies: A
Doctor Blows the Whistle on a Dangerous New Drug that Wrongfully Received IDA Approval,
READER'S DIG., Apr. 2008, http://www.rd.com/national-interest/consumer-safety/fda-approves-harmful-antibiotic/article.html.
105
See Hutt, supra note 1, at B-7. The social science literature drives home the impact
of negative, trust-destroying events in the regulatory context. See generally Paul Slovic, Trust,
Emotion, Sex, Politics, and Science: Surveying the Risk Assessment Battlefield, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 59.
106
Perhaps it can be argued that the two go hand-in-hand: a politicized agency is
prone to make mistakes on scientific issues. For example, a 2006 survey found that significant numbers of the FDA's own physicians and scientists reported pressure to recommend
that drugs be approved, even when they had reservations about the drug's safety and efficacy. See Union of Concerned Scientists, News & Views: Scientific Integrity Update, Sept.
2006, http://www.ucsusa.org/scientific-integrity/restoring/scientific-integrity-update-092006.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2008); see also OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FDA's REVIEW PROCESS FOR NEW DRUG APPLICATIONS: A MANAGEMENT REVIEW 12 (2003) (describing survey results indicating that twenty-one percent of
FDA researchers felt unable to raise concerns regarding drug efficacy due to workplace
pressures).
107
For example, the FDA Amendments Act of 2007 promises the addition of only
modest resources. During the Senate deliberations on the Act, Senator Kennedy estimated
that the Act would bring an additional $50 million to the Agency for its drug safety efforts.
153 CONG. REc. SI1,831 (2007) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). The basis for Senator Kennedy's estimate is unclear: while the Act does increase user fees, only an increase in appropriations will add the financial resources that Senator Kennedy forecasts. However,
whether additional appropriations will materialize is far from clear. Rep. Henry Waxman,
one of the main House sponsors of the Act, expressed concern over funding. He noted
that the "FDA will need a significant influx of resources to do what we are asking them to
do in [the FDA Amendments Act]," and that, although the legislation "gives FDA the enhanced ability to dedicate user fee dollars to these activities, it will be critical for Congress
to come forward with additional appropriated dollars. We simply have got to get FDA the
funds it needs to do their job well." 153 CONG. REc. H7602 (2007); see also id. at H7606
(statement of Rep. Van Hollen) ("Congress must also significantly increase federal appropriations to FDA so that the agency is able to fulfill its most basic responsibilities.").
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detail the dilemma the FDA faces.'10 "When the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act was originally enacted in 1938, the regulatory and
10 9
compliance issues faced by the FDA were comparatively simple."
Then,
[t] hrough the enactment of a series of landmark statutes, beginning
in the 1950s and extending through the 1970s, FDA was given a
mandate by Congress to review and approve prior to marketing, the
safety of color additives, human food additives and animal feed additives, as well as to review and approve the safety and effectiveness
human biological products
of new human drugs, new animal drugs,
110
and medical devices for human use.
As a result, "[tloday no new pharmaceutical product or medical technology can be used in the US without FDA first determining that it is
safe and effective for its intended use." '
The duties assigned to the FDA have, in recent years, expanded
exponentially. According to the report, "[d]uring the past two decades Congress has enacted 125 statutes that directly impact FDA's
regulatory responsibilities-an average of more than six each year-in
addition to the core provisions of the 1938 Act itself and its amendments from 1939 to 1987."'12 These statutes require "the development of implementing regulations, guidance, or other types of policy,
and some require the establishment of entire new regulatory programs. Virtually all require some type of scientific knowledge or expertise for the agency adequately to address them, "1 13 and in some
cases may require laboratory research. Despite Congress's imposition
of substantial additional responsibilities, "[n] one of these statutes is
accompanied by an appropriation of new personnel and increased
funding designed to allow adequate implementation." 1 4 In fact, during the past two decades, the Agency's funding and staffing levels have
remained static. From 1988 to 2007, the "FDA gained through appropriation only 646 new employees-an increase of 9 percent-and lost
15
more than $300 million [in annual appropriations] to inflation."'
108

See FDA SCIENCE AND MISSION AT RISK, supra note 45, §§ 3.0-3.3 (summarizing ma-

jor findings that the FDA cannot fulfill its mission due to lack of scientific organizational
structure, lack of workforce capacity, and weak information technology infrastructure).
109
Id. § 2.1.
110

Id.

Jd.
Id.; see also Hutt, supra note 1, at B-24-B-30 (listing statutes passed between 1988
112
and 2007 that increased the FDA's responsibilities); id. at B-31-B-32 (listing statutes of
general applicability passed from 1935 through 2002 that have a direct impact on the
FDA); id. at B-33-B-34 (listing Executive Orders issued from 1969 to 2007 that have had a
direct impact on the FDA).
113 Hutt, supra note 1, at B-4.
I11

114

Id.

115

FDA SCIENCE AND MISSION AT RISK, supra note 45, § 2.1 (emphasis added).
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In 2007, the FDA's budget was approximately $1.6 billion, and it had
roughly the same number of employees as it had fifteen years earlier.11 6 The report's conclusions are sobering: "This reality, combined
with a burgeoning industry... has made it increasingly impossible for
FDA to maintain its historic public health mission."' " 7 The report also
warns that, apart from the new drug approval process, which has
gained support from user fees since 1992, the decline in resources
available to the remainder of the FDA has been all the more severe. 18
"Because these [user fee] funds are in addition to appropriated
funds... the serious decline in appropriated support for other activities-many of which are core regulatory activities, but not covered by
user fees-has not been generally appreciated by those who look only
at bottom-line budget figures."'1 9 The report's conclusions echo
those that the prestigious National Academies of Science's Institute of
Medicine reached a year earlier, which concluded that the FDA is ill120
equipped to meet its public health mission.
The picture that emerges from these reports is alarming: the FDA
has been weakened from within; it lacks the infrastructure, scientific
resources, and expert personnel to do its job; and neither the Executive Branch nor Congress have shown a determination to shore up the
Agency's flagging resources. There should be no wonder that the
Agency, despite the best efforts of its dedicated staff, cannot keep
pace with its growing responsibilities. It is this structural weakness,
more than any other factor, that has triggered the decline of the FDA
both in terms of its public prestige and the deference it garners from
courts.
CONCLUSION

Professor O'Reilly and I agree that courts seem to be showing a
greater willingness to second-guess the FDA's judgments, even if we
disagree about the root cause of this trend. We also agree that, in the
long run, probing judicial review will impede the Agency's ability to
do its work swiftly and efficiently,
So the question becomes what, if anything, the Agency can do to
restore its preferred position in courts. First and foremost, the
Agency must renew its commitment to science. The FDA's ability to
reach this goal depends heavily upon strict adherence to scientifically
motivated decision making. Agency scientists should be insulated
116 Id. These figures exclude revenues brought in as user fees, which amounted to an
additional $352 million in 2007. See Hutt, supra note 1. at B-14.
117
FDA SCIENCE AND MISSION AT RISK, supra note 45, § 2.1.
118 See id.
119
120

Id.

See

INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE,

supra note 46, at 90.
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from political pressure when making decisions about which drugs and
medical devices warrant approval and about which measures are appropriate when addressing unforeseen risks with drugs and devices
that are already available. In short, politics and science should be separate at the FDA.
Second, the Agency must make its affirmative case to the public.
Too often, there has been a leadership void at the FDA. 12' Perhaps
the FDA has been surprisingly quiet, rarely defending itself in the
court of public opinion, because it has gone through long stretches
without a Senate-confirmed Commissioner. 122 Nor has the Bush Administration stepped in to defend the Agency. 123 This reticence has
contributed to an adverse effect on public health, and consequently
has eroded public confidence in the Agency.' 24 Regulatory mishaps,
especially highly publicized ones, occupy the attention of the press
but obscure the full story of the FDA's overall performance. 12 5 For
the most part, the FDA does a remarkable job keeping our drugs,
medical devices, foods, biological products, and radiological products
safe. The American public should judge the FDA on its excellent
track record for safety, but those many successes are often overshad126
owed by public outcry over isolated but highly publicized failures.
Third, the Agency needs to rebuild a credible enforcement program. The FDA has drastically reduced its enforcement efforts, signaling to industry that the regulatory cop is off the beat and that
121 See FDA SCIENCE AND MISSION AT RISK, supra note 45, § 1.2.1 (noting the erosion of
the Agency's organizational structure); see also U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Commissioners and Their Predecessors, http://www.fda.gov/oc/commissioners/default.htm
(last visited Apr. 9, 2008) (listing the tenure of each FDA Commissioner).
122 Hearings on the Nomination of Andrew Von Eschenbach and Paul DeCamp Before the Subcomm. on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, 109th Cong. 2 (2006) (statement of Sen.
Michael B. Enzi, Chairman, Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions) ("The
FDA has been without a confirmed Commissioner for all but 18 months out of the last 51/2
years.").
123
See FDA SCIENCE AND MISSION AT RISK, supra note 45, § 4.1.1 ("President Bush stated
that the current system must be fixed 'within available resources.' We can state unequivocally that the system cannot be fixed 'within available resources."') (citation omitted).
124
Cf id. (noting the Agency's belief that the system could not "be fixed" under the
approach of the current Administration).
125 See Beth Herskovits, Next FDA Head Faces Tough Road as Criticism Increases, PR WEEK,
Oct. 24, 2005, at 2.
126 Even what I have referred to as the Agency's "regulatory failures" involved difficult
and debatable questions of science. Consider the Vioxx controversy: the FDA welcomed
the development of the so-called COX-2 inhibitors (Vioxx, Bextra, and Celebrex) because
this new class of drugs held the promise of addressing a serious problem with the older
generation of nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs-namely, that they cause gastrointestinal bleeding in some patients, resulting in thousands of bleeding deaths a year. Thus, even
recognizing the additional risk of heart attack and stroke from COX-2 drugs, that risk may
be acceptable to patients prone to gastrointestinal bleeding. See generally In reVioxx Prods.
Liab. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 2d 776, 778-79 (E.D. La. 2007).
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infractions will go unenforced.1 27 The steep decline in enforcement
efforts sends the wrong message both to the regulated industries and
to the public. A weak FDA enforcement program inevitably leads to
weak compliance, thus undermining the Agency's responsibility to
safeguard the public health. The FDA must visibly enforce its governing statute to demonstrate to the industry that compliance is not
optional and that failure to obey the law will result in swift and certain
28
penalties. 1
Fourth, the Agency should reaffirm its commitment to making
publicly accountable decisions. The Agency suffered criticism for its
decision on preemption partly because it decided in a way that was
neither transparent nor publicly accountable, and which marked a departure from past practices. 129 The FDA Amendments Act, which imposes unprecedented disclosure requirements on the FDA, is a
response to what Congress perceived to be the Agency's lack of transparent decision making. 13 0 However, there is reason to worry that the
disclosure requirements that Congress has imposed will consume
scarce Agency resources and invite critics to second-guess Agency
decisions.
One hopeful sign of increased transparency is that the Agency
itself requested two independent audits of its capacity, the 2006 Institute of Medicine Report and the 2007 FDA Science and Mission at Risk
Report of the Agency's Advisory Science Board. 1 3 1 Both reports are
exhaustive and highly critical assessments of the Agency's ability to
fulfill its statutory duties; the Agency seems to be taking the reports
seriously. 13 2 Congress has adopted some of the Institute of Medicine's
127 The drop in enforcement activities by the Agency is nothing short of stunning. In
1991 through 1993, the Agency brought a total of 468 civil seizure actions, 75 criminal
injunction cases, and 121 criminal prosecutions. See Hutt, supra note 1, at B-22 to B-23.
However, from 2004 to 2007, the Agency brought a total of only 53 civil seizure actions, 57
criminal injunction cases, and no criminal prosecutions. Id. at B-23. The decline in FDA
warning letters is just as steep: from 1788 in 1993 to only 467 in 2007. Id. at B-23.
128
See id. at B-23 ("A weakened FDA inevitably leads to weak compliance with the
law."). Congress also showed concern over the steep drop in FDA enforcement efforts: the
FDA Amendments Act provides the FDA with increased authority to impose civil penalties
for violations of the Act, which may make it easier (if the Agency is so inclined) to rebuild
its enforcement capacity. See Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007,
Pub. L. No. 110-85, § 801 (b) (2), 121 Stat. 823, 920 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 331).
129 See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text; see also Mark Kaufman, FDA Tries to
Limit Drug Suits in State Courts, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 2006, at 1.
130
See, e.g., 153 CONG. REc. S11,837 (2007) (statement of Sen. Dodd).
131
See U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, FDA, THE FUTURE OF DRUG
SAFETY-PROMOTING AND PROTECTING THE HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC: FDA's RESPONSE TO THE

INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE'S 2006 REPORT (2007), http://www.fda.gov/oc/reports/iom013
007.pdf [hereinafter FDA's RESPONSE TO THE INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE]; FDA SCIENCE AND
MISSION AT RISK, supra note 45.
132
See FDA's RESPONSE TO THE INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 131; FDA SCIENCE
AND MISSION AT RISK,

supra note 45.
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recommendations in the FDA Amendments Act; the Agency is instituting other recommendations. 133 These are important first steps.
In reality, Congress, and not the FDA, ultimately will determine
the Agency's fate. If the Agency continues to administer self-inflicted
wounds, Congress will be powerless to heal it. But even with its house
in order, the FDA will be unable to accomplish all of its statutory duties unless Congress provides the resources and political insulation the
Agency needs to serve the American public.

133

SEE

FDA's

RESPONSE TO THE INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE,

supra note 131, at. 1-2.

